Analyzing Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Implications for Fairness in Collective Decision-Making

Introduction Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, formulated by economist Kenneth Arrow in 1951, is a cornerstone of social choice theory that highlights the challenges associated with collective decision-making. The theorem demonstrates that no voting system can simultaneously satisfy a set of fairness criteria when aggregating individual preferences into a collective decision. This paper aims to analyze the implications of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem for fairness in collective decision-making processes, exploring its relevance in contemporary political systems, economic frameworks, and social institutions. The discussion will focus on the theorem’s key assumptions, its implications for democratic governance, and the potential for alternative decision-making mechanisms that strive for fairness despite the theorem’s constraints.

Main Body

Understanding Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem At the heart of Arrow’s Theorem are five axioms that a fair voting system should ideally fulfill: unrestricted domain, non-dictatorship, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and universal admissibility. The theorem posits that no voting mechanism can meet all f